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Paying for another’s belief: the law on indirect religious discrimination 
[Draft 02] 
 
Peter Jones 
 
The Equality Act 2010 designates ‘religion or belief’ a ‘protected characteristic’.  The Act 
protects people in respect of all such characteristics from both direct and indirect 
discrimination.  A discriminates against B directly if ‘A treats B less favourably than A treats 
or would treat others’ (Pt 2, ch.2, s.13).  An employer is, for example, guilty of direct 
religious discrimination if he refuses to employ or promote a Muslim because he is a Muslim.  
A discriminates against B indirectly if A applies to B ‘a provision, criterion or practice’ 
(PCP) that disadvantages people who shares B’s characteristic, even though the disadvantage 
may be an incidental and unintended consequence of the PCP.  If, for example, an employer 
has a dress code for his employees and if it is more difficult for Muslims than for others to 
comply with that dress code, he is guilty, prima facie, of indirect religious discrimination 
(IRD).  He can, however, escape the charge of IRD if he can show that his PCP is ‘a 
proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim’ (Pt 2, ch. 2, s.19). 
 
The claim that direct discrimination, including direct religious discrimination, is unfair is 
unlikely to be challenged.  The claim that indirect discrimination, particularly indirect 
religious discrimination, is unfair is altogether more controversial.  Consider the following 
case. 
 
Sarah Desrosiers owned and ran a small hairdressing salon in North London, named 
‘Wedge’.  She advertised for an assistant stylist and Bushra Noah applied for the position.  
Noah was a Muslim who wore a headscarf that covered her hair entirely.  That itself was not 
for Desrosiers an obstacle to her employing Noah.  However, during the course of an 
interview, Desrosiers discovered that Noah would refuse to remove her headscarf while she 
was working in the salon.  That was a problem for Desrosiers, since she required the hair-
styles of her hairdressers to be visible to the salon’s customers.  Her salon offered an 
‘alternative’ form of hair dressing, which she described as ‘ultra-modern’ and ‘urban, edgy 
and funky’. She wanted her hairdressers to use their own hair to model the salon’s style (a 
practice common in hair salons in Britain).  Because Noah was unwilling to comply with that 
practice, Desrosiers did not offer her the position.  Noah responded by registering a claim of 
unlawful discrimination against Desrosiers. 
An Employment Tribunal heard the case during Spring 2008.  Noah claimed she had been 
subject to both direct and indirect discrimination.  The Tribunal dismissed her claim of direct 
discrimination, but decided her claim of indirect discrimination was well-founded.  
Desrosiers’ practice of requiring her employees to show their hair placed female Muslims, 
who, like Noah, wore a headscarf for religious reasons, at a disadvantage compared with 
those who adhered to other faiths or to none.  Moreover, the Tribunal decided that Desrosier 
had not shown that her PCP, requiring employees to reveal their hair, was ‘a proportionate 
means of achieving a legitimate aim’.1  Noah claimed compensation of £34,000.  The 
Tribunal awarded her £4000 in respect of ‘injury to feelings’.  Of greater moment for 
Desrosiers was the estimated £40,000 she had to sacrifice in preparing for the trial and the 
prospect of bankruptcy.
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How should we view the outcome of this case?  Was it a triumph for fairness, since it upheld 
Noah’s right not to be deprived of an employment opportunity because of her religious faith?  
Or was it an injustice, since it deprived Desrosiers of the right to run her business according 
to her own preferred (and not unreasonable) practice, simply because that practice did not suit 
a religious believer whose beliefs Desrosiers did not share?   
The answer to those questions depends in large part on where we should place the 
responsibility for the situation in which Noah found herself.  Was Desrosier at fault for 
having a PCP that did not accommodate Noah’s religion, or should Noah have borne the 
‘cost’ of complying with her religious belief rather than export that cost to someone else? 3  
 
Choice, responsibility and belief 
People’s religious beliefs, it is often claimed, differ from their race or gender in being chosen 
and they warrant different treatment because they are chosen.  We are unlikely to find that 
claim persuasive in relation to direct discrimination; even if people do choose their beliefs, 
we are unlikely to accept that, as a consequence, they should be open to direct discrimination 
in employment and in their access to goods and services.  But choice may well make a 
difference to our thinking on IRD.  If my chosen beliefs clash with an employer’s practice, 
why should it fall to the employer to bear the costs of my choice?  People cannot reasonably 
expect to choose without bearing the consequences of their choice. If my choice renders me 
less eligible for employment, I should not be able to offload the cost of that choice onto an 
employer. 
So can people be said to choose their beliefs? The notion that they do runs into two 
objections. First, people cannot choose what to believe; they can believe only what appears to 
them to be the case.  I cannot choose to believe that Madrid is in France rather than Spain and 
I cannot choose to believe that the earth is flat rather than spherical. Secondly, the notion that 
people choose their religious beliefs flies in the face of sociological reality.  For most of the 
world’s population, religious belief is a consequence of family or community socialisation.  
Catholic communities beget Catholics and Muslim societies beget Muslims. Of course that is 
not true without exception but, in the context of world’s believing population, converts into 
and out of faiths constitute a tiny minority. 
The first of these objections is less than conclusive.  Choices do not have to be arbitrary to be 
real.  I may have reason to pursue a career in law rather than medicine and that reason may 
outweigh all reasons to the contrary, but my career in law can still be ‘chosen’. Moreover, 
since religious belief is underdetermined by evidence, it is clearly different in character from 
belief that Madrid is in Spain or that the earth is spherical.  There is scope for epistemic 
discretion in matters of religious belief, even though the language of ‘choice’ is too gauche to 
describe that discretion appropriately.  If there were no discretion, the idea of ‘freedom of 
belief’ would make little sense. (Compare the oddity of ‘freedom of race’ or ‘freedom of 
gender’.)  
The second objection is harder to gainsay. It is just a fact about our world that, for the great 
majority of religious believers, the social context in which they have developed has been the 
principal determinant of their religious belief.  That is one reason why the phenomena of 
religion and culture are so closely associated. Should this feature of religious belief preclude 
our requiring people to take responsibility for what they believe and for the consequences of 
their belief?   
Arguably, it matters less how people have come to hold their beliefs than how they now 
regard them. There may be a large element of inheritance in their beliefs but, if they now 
embrace and endorse those beliefs, they cannot present them to others as burdens with which 
they have been saddled by circumstance and for which they should receive compensation.  
The reality is, of course, that people do not present their beliefs to others in that way.  They 
hold that others should take their beliefs seriously because they take them seriously; it is 
because they embrace and endorse their beliefs that others must respect their beliefs.  So the 
claims that the religious make upon others in respect of their beliefs is typically grounded in 
their strong identification with their beliefs, not in the complaint that their beliefs are 
burdensome misfortunes with which they have been saddled by the past and for which they 
should take no responsibility.  They are wise to do so, since the ‘burdensome misfortune’ 
complaint would invite others not to take seriously the beliefs of the complainers. 
The principle of freedom of belief involves the notion that your beliefs are ‘none of my 
business’.  It does, of course, leave me free to make my own assessment of your beliefs.  But, 
even if I assess your beliefs as bizarre, implausible, heretical, benighted or lacking merit in 
some other way, the principle debars my impeding or interfering with your freedom to hold 
and pursue whatever beliefs you possess.  But if your beliefs become a source of positive 
rather than merely negative claims against me, so that I have, for example, to give up 
resources or to adjust my behaviour out of deference to your belief, your belief does 
reasonably becomes ‘my business’.  If your belief is going to impose positive obligations on 
me, it is entirely reasonable that I should judge it and, if I find it wanting, dismiss it as a 
reason for my having those positive obligations.   
We can add the more general point that freedom of belief is supposed to work both ways 
round: it is freedom to embrace and freedom to reject a belief.  If X’s embracing p is reason 
for Y’s incurring positive obligations with respect to X, why should that reason not be 
cancelled by Y’s believing in not-p?  Why should my belief that Christ was the Son of God 
count for more than your belief that he was not; and why should your belief that Mohammed 
was God’s Prophet count for more than my belief that he was not?  After all, we find it no 
more acceptable that people should be made to comply with religious beliefs they reject than 
that they should be prevented from complying with religious beliefs they accept.   
A final consideration is the way the courts deal with religious belief.  Their practice is to 
refrain from subjecting religious beliefs to any sort of test of plausibility, reasonableness, or 
orthodoxy.  They do subject claims of belief to a sincerity test and they will not protect 
manifestations of belief that are inconsistent with ‘basic standards of human dignity and 
integrity’.4  But, within those broad limits, courts do not subject the content of beliefs to any 
form of quality control.  It is entirely appropriate that they should not; courts are not the right 
bodies to rule on abstruse and contentious points of theology.  But if a legal system leaves the 
religious beliefs that people are free to embrace and pursue so comprehensively free of 
quality control, if it imposes no check upon their plausibility or reasonableness, it is hard to 
accept that a believer, merely in virtue of embracing a belief, should be able to impose 
positive obligations upon others. 
 
Beliefs and consequences 
The considerations marshalled in the previous section argue strongly for requiring people to 
take responsibility for their beliefs and for the demands of their beliefs. But they relate to 
only half the picture.  There are consequences of belief that we can regard as uniquely 
consequences of belief, such as the Christian sabbatarian’s having to forgo the recreational 
activites in which others engage on Sundays and the Muslim’s having to devote time to 
praying five times a day.  But the consequences at stake in IRD are not of that kind.  They are 
consequences that arise from the intersection of belief with a social arrangement that is 
external to the belief.  For example, Bushra Noah ran into problems not merely because her 
religion required her to cover her hair but because that requirement in combination Sarah 
Desrosier’s practice of requiring her hairdressers to show their hair, precluded her gaining 
employment in Desrosier’s salon.  Her failure to gain employment was not uniquely a 
consequence of her belief; it was the joint consequence of her belief and Desrosier’s practice.  
We might therefore hold Noah and Desrosier jointly responsible for Noah’s predicament or 
assign primary responsibility to Desrosier. 
If people are to take responsibility for their belief, it follows that a society should provide for 
the distribution of freedom and resources amongst its citizens without reference to the 
different beliefs of different believers.  So we might imagine a society first establishing a 
basic structure of freedoms and making provision (through the market or other mechanisms) 
for the distribution of resources; it will then leave citizens at liberty to use their freedom and 
resources to pursue their beliefs as they see fit.  The demands of people’s particular beliefs 
should not dictate the freedoms or the resources to which they are entitled. 
Consider, for example, believers who subscribe to faiths that require them to go on 
pilgrimages and to construct places of worship such as churches, temples, mosques and 
synagogues.  The approach I have proposed will require them to fund pilgrimages and places 
of worship from their own resources, rather than, say, through public taxation that would 
oblige those who do not share the relevant beliefs to contribute to the costs of those religious 
endeavours.  This may seem nothing like the case of indirect discrimination, but it is to the 
extent that it is not their beliefs alone that oblige the religious to devote resources to 
pilgrimages and religious buildings.  It is also the fact that those who provide travel services 
and construct buildings charge for materials and labour at the going rates. Thus, the expense 
incurred by believers is not uniquely a consequence of their belief; it is a consequence of the 
intersection of their beliefs with a social arrangement concerning the provision of goods and 
services.  We could therefore hold that, since believers’ having to pay for pilgrimages and 
buildings is not a state of affairs produced by the believers alone but is jointly brought about 
by the believers, on the one hand, and the suppliers of goods and services on the other, the 
two parties should share joint responsibility for the ‘consequence’.  The believers should pay 
half the cost and the suppliers should bear the other half or perhaps receive it in the form of a 
public subsidy provided by a society at large.  That proposal is unlikely to find favour with 
anyone.  It is perfectly true that believers are not the only agents responsible for the costs of 
going on pilgrimages and constructing places of worship; but, provided the believers have 
been treated in the same way as others in the background system for allocating resources, it 
will be fair that they should bear those costs and not export them to others. 
Where does that leave the case for making legal provision against IRD?  There is one feature 
of existing British law that is congruent with what I have argued above.  As previously 
indicated, a PCP used by an employer or provider of goods and services does not fall foul of 
discrimination law if it is ‘a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim’.  The spirit of 
that provision is that people should not be prevented by the beliefs of others from pursuing 
the normal aims of normal organisations, or from doing so in ways that are clearly 
appropriate to those aims.  Up to the threshold set by the proportionality criterion, the 
employer or provider is obliged to accommodate the believer but, once that criterion is met, 
the wish of the employer or provider prevails.  Thus, the proportionality test functions, or 
should function, as a priority rule in which an organisation’s ‘normal activity’ trumps the 
competing claims of a believer. 
It is well to remember that this priority rule applies not just to business organisations whether 
they are large corporations or small businesses like Sarah Desrosiers’s.  It applies to any 
organisation that is an employer or a provider of goods or services, including government 
departments, government agencies, local authorities, charities, schools and universities. Its 
spirit also applies to religious organisations.  The law allows religious organisations to 
discriminate on grounds of religious belief, within limits, in employment and in the provision 
of goods and services and it would be absurd if it did not.  It also allows organised religions 
to discriminate on grounds of gender and sexual orientation insofar as compliance with their 
doctrines and the strongly held convictions of their followers requires that discrimination.  I 
shall not pause to consider the details here.
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  I draw attention only to the fact that the 
discrimination law governing organised religions and other religious organisations embodies 
the same principle that an organisation should not be prevented by obligations to 
accommodate others from pursuing its core aims through proportionate means.   
 
Providing against indirect religious discrimination 
Is there then a case for combatting IRD at all?  There are several considerations, other than 
those that have been my central concern, that bear on the case for IRD legislation.  One is the 
need to provide against covert direct discrimination. Another is the desirability of weeding 
out practices that disadvantage the religious for no good reason; practices that may have been 
costless in a largely mono-faith society may not remain so once the religious make-up of the 
society changes.  A third is the social issues that we run into when religious differences track 
ethnic divisions, as they do in Britain and many other European societies, so that religious 
disadvantage compounds racial disadvantage.   
These considerations argue powerfully for some legal provision against IRD.  However, I do 
not mean to rely on them to the exclusion of the consideration that has been my primary 
concern: the claims that people have simply as conscientious bearers of religious belief.  
Freedom of belief requires that people should not be prevented from living in accordance 
with their beliefs.  If we are committed to that freedom, it is entirely intelligible that we 
should regret clashes between the demands of a religious belief and a society’s public or 
private arrangements that result in believers being ‘burdened’ in ways that other people are 
not.  Such burdens may not deprive people of freedom of belief strictly speaking, but they are 
a form of cost or disadvantage and we may reasonably regret that people’s religious beliefs 
should be a source of social disadvantage for them.   A society committed to freedom of 
belief can therefore reasonably wish to mitigate the burdens that people incur when beliefs 
clash with its public or private arrangements, insofar as that mitigation is reasonable. But we 
are then left with the question of what sort or degree of mitigation is ‘reasonable’. My answer 
is: mitigation that does not impose significant costs upon others.
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  That is also the answer 
implicit in the test that provides a legal defence against claims of IRD: whether the PCP at 
issue is a proportionate means for achieving a legitimate aim.  If a PCP fails that test, the 
implication is that it can be set aside without significant cost to the employer or provider.   
It remains important, however, that the proportionality test should be conceived in the right 
way.  The thrust of my argument is that it should be conceived as a priority rule that sets a 
threshold rather than as a balancing rule that weighs competing interests.  The proportionality 
of the employer’s or provider’s means (his PCP) should be judged in relation to his aim, 
provided the aim is ‘legitimate’; if the means so judged is proportionate, that should trump 
the competing claim of the believer.  The test should not be one in which the interest of the 
believer is weighed against that of the employer or provider and the proportionality of the 
PCP is made to turn on the relative weight of the interests at stake. Frequently, when courts 
apply a test of proportionality in other areas of law, they adopt a balancing approach and that 
approach has sometimes been used by Tribunals dealing with cases of IRD.  Indeed, it 
figured in the Tribunal’s assessment in Noah v. Desrosier.7  What I have argued here 
challenges the rightness of that approach. Rather, we should begin by assessing the 
legitimacy of the employer’s or provider’s aim. If it is legitimate, we should judge the 
proportionality of the means (the PCP) solely in terms of that aim.  If accommodating the 
wish of the believer is consistent with proportionate means so judged, it should be 
accommodated; if it is not, it should not be accommodated. 
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